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WHEN ANTITRUST FAILS: PUBLIC HEALTH,
PUBLIC HOSPITALS, AND PUBLIC VALUES
Michael S. Jacobs*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEMS OF PUBLIC HOSPITALS
IN INCREASINGLY COMPETITIVE MARKETS
In the past few years, large operating deficits have led governmental
authorities in several major cities to close, sell, or substantially reduce
the services of their public hospitals.' These decisions portend the arrival
of what the New York Times has called a "looming crisis" in health care
for the urban poor and uninsured.2 Should this crisis unfold, many public
health programs are likely to be casualties, including those designed to
treat and prevent the spread of communicable disease.
Among others, programs aimed at the so-called "new" (multidrug
resistant) tuberculosis3 are especially vulnerable to these compelling
budgetary constraints. Poor urban populations face an elevated risk of
contracting tuberculosis (TB);4 and when they do contract it, they often
seek care in public hospital emergency departments.5 The prospect of
public hospital closures obviously threatens to eliminate or reduce these
sources of care, which provide many of the most accessible sites for the
treatment and control of the disease. Moreover, public hospitals
* Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law. B.A., 1968, Dartmouth College; J.D.,
1971, Yale Law School; M.P.H., 1987, Johns Hopkins University.
1. See, e.g., Kevin Sack, Hard Cases at the Hospital Door, N.Y. Times, Sept 17, 1995, § 4, at 5;
see also Katherine Eban Finkelstein, Bellevue's Emergency, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1996, § 6, at 45.
2. See Jennifer Preston, As Revenues Drop, Hospitals Talk of Forsaking Charity Care, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 14, 1996, § 1, at 1. The latest estimates reckon the number of uninsured Americans at
"greater than 41 million, and... increasing by 100,000 per month." Jerome P. Kassirer, Our Ailing
Public Hospitals-Cure Them or Close Them?, 333 New Eng. J. Med. 1348, 1349 (1995).
3. For a description of the new tuberculosis and some of the distinctive public health problems
that it creates, see Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Resurgent Tuberculosis Epidemic in the Era of AIDS:
Reflections on Public Health, Law, and Society, 54 Md. L. Rev. 1 (1995).
4. See Peter E. Sokolove et al., Exposure of Emergency Department Personnel to Tuberculosis:
PPD Testing During an Epidemic in the Community, 24 Annals Emergency Med. 418, 419 (1994)
("There is a higher incidence of tuberculosis in patients who are foreign born, homeless, recently
incarcerated, or chronically debilitated .... ').
5. Id; see also, e.g., Fewer MDR-TB Cases Seen in Inner City Than Expected, AIDS Wtdy., Oct.
30, 1995 ("The incidence of tuberculosis has increased in urban areas in the late 1980s and early
1990s and many patients are cared for in public hospitals.").
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administer outreach programs intended to educate and serve populations
at high risk of contracting TB. Healthcare experts predict that not only
will tuberculosis spread faster in the absence of public hospitals, but that
their closures will also place extraordinary demands on mental health
programs and homeless shelters.6
Of course, besides their work in combating TB, public hospitals
perform other valuable social services. They function as community
hospitals for their neighborhoods.7 They train nurses, medical students,
and new physicians in the care of patients! They often contain the only
special-care units in their regions.9 And they conduct important clinical
and basic research.'" Their survival arguably should be an important
public priority.
As noted above, however, public hospitals now face a serious risk of
financial failure. Several factors are to blame. Over the past twenty years,
reductions in state and federal healthcare financing, along with shrinking
municipal budgets, have combined to make public payers a less reliable,
and less remunerative, source of income. At the same time, and perhaps
more significantly, the rapid commercialization of private healthcare
markets has reshaped the hospital industry," placing public hospitals at a
severe competitive disadvantage. Mounting concern with the high cost of
healthcare has encouraged the growth of managed care corporations 2
and the emergence of free-standing, outpatient service providers. 3 These
newly aggressive buyers and less expensive alternatives, have forced
hospitals to find ways of lowering their costs and prices. In particular, the
bargaining power exerted by large managed care organizations has
forced individual hospitals, and even small hospital chains, to grant them
substantial price discounts in order to attract the patient volume
necessary for profitability. 4 To acquire some bargaining leverage of their
6. Kevin Sack, Hard Cases at the Hospital Door, N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1995, § 4, at 5.
7. In the early 1980s there were almost 1800 public hospitals in the United S:ates, but the latest
figures show that as of 1993 only 1390 remained. American Hosp. Ass'n, Hospital Statistics: The
AHA Profile of United States Hospitals 7 (1994).
8. Kassirer, supra note 2, at 1348.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1349.
12. Robert J. Samuelson, Managed Care Revolution, Wash. Post, Oct. 25, 1995, at A19.
13. See, e.g., Michael Abramowitz, Health War Intensifies in Annapolis, Wash. Post, Mar. 26,
1996, at B1 (reporting that number of ambulatory surgery centers has doubled in five years due, in
part, to their cost-effectiveness).
14. See, e.g., Edward B. Hirshfeld, The Health Care Industry's Transformatio' and the Antitrust
Laws, in Antitrust and Evolving Health Care Marets 18-21 (Edward B. Hirshfeld et al. eds., 1995)
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own and also to achieve the kinds of savings and efficiencies necessary
to compete effectively in the new environment, private hospitals have
decided lately, in unprecedented numbers, to merge with one another,
effectively restructuring the hospital industry. 5
Though slow to react to these changes, public hospitals have hardly
been immune from their effects. Aging physical plants, high operation
costs, ambitious social programs, commitments to medical education and
research, and largely-uninsured patient populations make public hospitals
comparatively expensive to operate and thus ill-suited to the demands of
an increasingly competitive market.'6  Faced with diminishing
governmental support, public hospitals-like their private counterparts-
have become critically dependent for their survival on attracting the
business of managed care groups, whose substantial memberships and
capitated payments promise high utilization and steady revenue. 7 Unlike
private hospitals, however, which have, for the most part, spent the past
few years cutting costs, eliminating unprofitable services, and merging
with competitors, public hospitals have retained their old structures,
organizational forms, and social programs. As a result, their prices for
services provided to paying patients have remained relatively high,
effectively disqualifying them from the competition for managed care
contracts.
To make matters worse, the vigorous economizing of private hospitals
has not simply lowered their own costs. It has indirectly raised the costs
of public hospitals and undermined any attempts they might make to
become more competitive. In growing numbers, private hospitals are
eliminating or reducing their own small charitable and social service
programs and declining to treat "unprofitable" patients, whose age or
underlying illnesses make them relatively expensive to serve.18 Because
(stating that managed care companies cap provider costs "by employing professionals and acquiring
hospitals and other institutions, or by contracting with independent providers on a capitation basis,"
and that "[t]he largest percentage of cost savings achieved by managed care is due to reduced use of
hospital services").
15. See infra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., Finkelstein, supra note 1.
17. See, e.g., Laurie McGinley, Acute Pain: Retooling of Medicare, Medicaid Will Increase
Pressure on Hospitals, Wall St. J., Oct. 2, 1995, at Al.
18. See, e.g., Preston, supra note 2 ("With managed care driving down their revenues, many
hospitals around the country say they can no longer afford to provide free medical care to the
growing number of uninsured who have come through their doors seeking treatment for everything
from the flu to heart disease."); see also California Hospital Under Fire for Seeking Healthier
Patients, Mod. Healthcare, Aug. 21, 1995, at 172 (describing report that University of California
Irvine Medical Center, having experienced "a dramatic increase in patients ...with recently
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the programmatic and medical needs of these patients persist, however,
they must turn to public hospitals, when they can, for the high-cost
services that the private sector now refuses to provide.' 9 Forced in this
manner to bear by themselves the financial responsibility for unprofitable
services and programs, public hospitals are becoming increasingly more
expensive than their private counterparts and thus losing more ground in
the competition for managed care contracts.20
Because they cannot simultaneously honor their social obligations and
compete successfully against the private sector, public hospitals face a
bleak future. In order to survive, they may be forced to re;emble private
hospitals, declining to offer many of the social and public health
programs that they have struggled so hard to preserve. The threat to the
traditional role of public hospitals is a threat to public health. If public
hospitals are compelled to abandon their social programs, private
hospitals are unlikely to revive them. The unrelenting pressure to reduce
costs would discourage all hospitals from resuscitating programs of
proven unprofitability, especially when governments are unwilling or
unable to finance the shortfalls. Even if public hospitals can survive in a
more "privatized" form, the loss of these programs will inflict serious
harm on populations already disadvantaged.
The plight of public hospitals underscores an apparent failure in the
workings of an unregulated market for healthcare. When private and
public firms compete to provide hospital services, the lower costs that
result are a boon for those who can afford to purchase health care. In
today's environment, however, those lower costs are achieved in
substantial measure by abandoning important if unprofitable public
programs. If public hospitals are to survive direct competition with their
private counterparts, they must adopt the private sector's cost-cutting
strategies. But those strategies spell misfortune for people who cannot
afford to buy healthcare. In this arena, unregulated competition appears
incompatible with social welfare broadly conceived.
This dilemma in turn raises questions about the fit between neo-
classical economics and the antitrust analysis of hospital markets. Neo-
classical economists would likely regard the recent outbreak of
diagnosed serious conditions that require expensive treatments," had informed its: medical staff that
it could "no longer tolerate patients with complex and expensive-to-treat conditions").
19. Karen Donelan et al., Whatever Happened to the Health Insurance Crisis in the United
States? Voices from a National Survey, 276 JAMA 1346, 1348 (1996).
20. This is an arguably unintentional and non-conspiratorial variant of the "rasing rivals' costs"
theory. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals'
Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 Yale L.J. 209 (1986).
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competition in hospital markets as an unmitigated blessing for
consumers. In important respects, it is: after years of seeming immunity
to competitive forces and apparent indifference to their chronic excess
capacity," private hospitals finally have begun to lower costs, merging to
achieve economies of scale and eliminate duplicative equipment, services
and personnel.' Assuming that the quality of hospital care has remained
at an acceptable level, the lower prices resulting from this activity are an
obvious benefit for consumers. The problem, of course, is that not all
who need care can afford to pay. A narrow focus on consumer prices
ignores the needs of this impoverished group and institutions that serve
them.
Because antitrust policy has largely embraced the reasoning of neo-
classical economics, the transformation-by-merger of this country's
hospital and medical services industry has occurred with the tacit
approval of federal antitrust enforcement agencies and the growing
encouragement of federal antitrust courts. For the past two decades, these
authorities have fashioned antitrust enforcement around the basic
premises of the Chicago School: business arrangements conducive to
lower consumer prices are presumptively lawful and concerns about the
"subjective" and "nebulous" social implications of business behavior
have no useful place in antitrust discourse.' On this view, unless mergers
can be shown likely to raise prices, either by creating a monopolist or
facilitating collusion in a tighter oligopoly, they will survive antitrust
challenge because they promise the merging firms economies of scale
and other efficiencies apt to be reflected in lower consumer prices.24
Overlooked by this view are those who need hospital services but
cannot afford to purchase them. Mergers between private hospitals, and
the continued consolidation of managed care companies, seem to have
generated lower prices for paying customers, but in the process they have
jeopardized the continued existence of social programs and charity care
critical for those too poor to be considered "consumers." Although those
21. See, e.g., McGinley, supra note 17, at Al. ("Almost every U.S. metropolitan area is
'overbedded.' The Denver area, for example, is glutted with more than 30 hospitals, many operating
at just 40% of capacity. In Philadelphia, more than 40% of the beds aren't needed .... ").
22. Victor Tabbush & Gerald Swanson, Changing Paradigms in Medical Payment, 156 Archives
Internal Med. 357 (1996).
23. See, e.g., Michael S. Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative Foundations ofAntitrust Economics,
74 N.C. L. Rev. 219, 229-30 (1995). For a discussion of the basic tenets of the Chicago School's
antitrust philosophy, see Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School ofAntitrust Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 925 (1979).
24. See, e.g., FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1213 (1lth Cir. 1991); Hospital
Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1391 (7th Cir. 1986).
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with money may now pay less for hospital care, those without face the
real prospect of losing their providers of last, or only, resort.
Current antitrust thinking is ill-equipped to resolve this conflict
between consumer welfare and the well-being of the poor. In most
markets, this conflict is analytically irrelevant: antitrust normally regards
the poor as not "entitled" to most goods or services. But healthcare is
different. Because antitrust enforcement policy ignores th-is difference, it
mistakenly assumes that lower prices inevitably enhance social welfare.
The economic principles that inform antitrust analysis are blind to the
concerns of public hospitals. Moreover, institutional constraints, such as
rules of standing and of evidence, along with traditional notions about
the limits of judicial competence, foreclose antitrust: courts from
undertaking the kinds of wide-ranging inquiries necessary to comprehend
and remedy the competitive disadvantages of public hospitals. As a
result, antitrust policy overlooks the "market" for public health, a
shortcoming that marks not just a failure of antitrust policy, but a failure
of unregulated competition in the market for hospital services.
This Article first describes the great wave of mergers that has occurred
in the hospital and managed care industries over the past few years. It
then discusses the responses of antitrust courts to this dramatic increase
in concentration. Finally, concluding that antitrust doctrine does not and
cannot usefully consider the social implications of this concentration, it
argues that renewed regulation of fhe hospital industry is both inevitable
and necessary, not only because it is a moral imperative but also because
unbridled competition in this area does not serve society well.
II. HOSPITAL MERGERS AND HMO GROWTH
The past two years have witnessed an unprecedented number of
hospital mergers. In 1994, more than 650' of the nation's 510026
hospitals took part in a merger or acquisition. Although a majority of
those transactions involved the purchase of individual for-profit hospitals
by large, for-profit chains, 301 private nonprofit hospitals also
participated in mergers during that year.27 An industry publication
described the events of 1994 as a "merger frenzy" and remarked that
"[n]othing in recent history seems to parallel the activity."2
25. Sandy Lutz, Let's Make a Deal, Mod. Healthcare, Dec. 19, 1994.
26. McGinley, supra note 17, at Al.
27. Lutz, supra note 25.
28. Id.
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In 1995, hospital merger activity surpassed the record level of the
previous year.29 Seven hundred and thirty-five hospitals merged,
including 445 nonprofits. Industry surveys show that in the last two years
alone twenty percent of all nonprofit hospitals changed hands. To place
these developments in perspective, one need only consider the number of
hospital mergers that occurred in prior years. The American Hospital
Association, which until recently had been the only organization to track
hospital mergers, counted eighteen mergers in 1993,30 fifteen in 1992,
twenty-three in 1991, and thirteen in 1990.31 The effect of the recent
spate of mergers on market concentration has been amplified by the
approximately 400 hospital closures that have occurred over the past five
years.
Representatives of the private hospital industry attribute the wave of
mergers to the growth of managed care.3" According to the Washington
Post, the percentage of workers in managed care programs rose from
twenty-nine percent in 1988 to seventy percent in 1995, a rise
accompanied by draatic reductions in the rate of increase in corporate
health spending.33 The Wall Street Journal reported that in 1994 publicly
traded managed care organizations (including HMOs) completed thirteen
acquisitions totaling over four billion dollars.34 Relatively low prices
have also made managed care an increasingly attractive option to
Medicare enrollees. Last year, for example, the American Association of
Retired Persons announced plans to license its name to managed care
organizations across the country, increasing the likelihood that many of
its thirty-three million members will enroll in managed care groups.3
Nonprofit insurance companies are also merging to reorganize as
29. Sandy Lutz, Mergers and Acquisitions Report, 1995: A Record Year for Hospital Deals, Mod.
Healthcare, Dec. 18, 1995, at43.
30. Id.
31. Lutz, supra note 25.
32. See, e.g., Hearings on Global and Innovation-Based Competition Before the Fed. Trade
Comm'n, Nov. 14, 1995 (statement of Joe Sims, of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue); Hearings on
Global and Innovation-Based Competition Before the Fed. Trade Comm "n, Nov. 7, 1995 (statement
of Richard L. Scott, Pres. & CEO of Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp.).
33. Samuelson, supra note 12, at A19.
34. See George Anders, Money Machines: HMOs Pile Up Billions in Cash, Try to Decide What to
Do With It, wall St. J., Dec. 21, 1994, atAl.
35. Milt Freudenheim, A.A.R.P. Will License Its Name to Managed Health Care Plans, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 29, 1996, at Al.
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managed care companies capable of competing more effectively against
ever larger HMOs.36
It is hardly surprising that HMOs should merge and consolidate.
Through merger, HMOs can realize substantial economies in
administrative, transactional, and purchasing costs. They can monitor
more effectively the practice patterns of their physicians, with a view to
reducing unnecessary treatment and testing. Mergers also increase the
size of individual HMOs, placing more members and thus more
healthcare dollars under their control. In turn, increased size enables
HMOs to drive hard bargains with hospitals. In communities with
competing hospitals, large HMOs can successfully initiate bidding wars,
forcing down the price of hospital services for HMO members,
compelling the hospitals to cut costs to be competitive, and ultimately
prompting the hospitals to merge to achieve the economies and increased
bargaining power that consolidation can provide.
Interestingly, while hospitals claim that the growth of managed care
companies has forced them to merge, managed care companies view
their own mergers primarily as a necessary response to the rapid
consolidation of hospitals, doctors, and medical suppliers.37
Alternatively, they see mergers as compelled by the demands of large
employers for "ever-lower premiums and fewer administrative hassles in
managing their health benefits programs." '3 Whatever the cause,
healthcare markets are rapidly becoming more concentrated through a
process of merger, cost-cutting, and more merger.
36. See, e.g., Robert Tomsho, Blue Cross Plans in Texas, Illinois Intend to Merge, Wall St. J., Jan.
31, 1996, at B3 (reporting that in response to "increasing pressure from for-profit insurers and
health-maintenance organizations in the tumultuous race to land managed-care contracts," Blue
Cross/Blue Shield (BC/BS) programs around country are merging with one another, since 1985,
number ofBC/BS plans has decreased from 86 to 66).
37. See, e.g., Ron Winslow & Leslie Scism, Aetna Agrees to Acquire U.S. Healthcare, Wall St. J.,
Apr. 2, 1996, at A2 (reporting that merger will create nation's largest managed-healthcare company,
serving 23 million people).
38. Ron Winslow, Kaiser Permanente Unit, Group Health Enter Talks Tat Could Lead To
Merger, Wall St. J., Sept. 16, 1996, at B6.
906
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III. THE ANTITRUST RESPONSE TO HEALTHCARE
CONSOLIDATION
A. Hospital Mergers
Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers and acquisitions if, "in
any line of commerce... in any section of the country, the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to
create a monopoly." '39 Section 7 requires the party challenging the merger
(usually the government) to establish three elements."0 It must
satisfactorily define (1) the relevant "line of commerce" (the product
market or service market) and (2) the relevant "section of the country"
(the geographic market)41 and then must show that (3) the proposed
merger would result in a market with so few firms as to threaten the
continuation of competitive pricing.42 The notion that informs these
requirements is that in highly concentrated markets (those with just a few
firms) price-fixing conspiracies are more likely both to occur and to go
undetected.43
Traditionally, parties in hospital merger cases have agreed on the
relevant line of commerce, usually defined as "acute care inpatient
hospital services." But they have often disagreed about the scope of the
relevant geographic market, the area "in which the seller operates and to.
which the purchaser can practicably turn." Plaintiffs have sought to
define the market as local (and therefore small and more heavily
concentrated by the merger) while defendants have argued for a more
expansive market (so as to dilute the concentrative effects of the merger).
Until last year, antitrust courts, with one exception,4 6 had generally
sided with plaintiffs, regarding hospital competition as local in nature,
39. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 355-56 (1963) (considering
proposed bank merger).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 363.
43. Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1391 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S.
1038 (1987).
44. See, e.g., FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., No. 1:96-CV-49, 1996 WL 570479, at *4 (W.D.
Mich. Sept. 26, 1996).
45. Tampa Elec. v. Nashville Coal, 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1960).
46. See United States v. Carilion Health Sys., 707 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Va.) (finding that patients
in Roanoke, Virginia would travel to Richmond, 165 miles away, for many kinds of hospital
services), a/I'd, 892 F.2d 1042 (4th Cir. 1989).
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confined within a relatively small geographic area.47 Writing for the
Seventh Circuit in an oft-cited opinion, Judge Posner expressed the
consensus view:
But for the most part, hospital services are local. People want to be
hospitalized near their families and homes, in hospitals in which
their own-local--doctors have hospital privileges. . . . [The
defendant's] proposal [as to the relevant geographic market] is
ridiculous-a ten county area in which it is assumed (without any
evidence and contrary to common sense) that Rockford residents,
or third-party payers, will be searching out small, obscure hospitals
in remote rural areas if the prices charged by the hospitals in
Rockford rise above competitive levels.48
The practical effect of defining hospital markets as local, instead of
regional or national, is to discourage mergers. In small markets, big firms
presumably have more power to harm consumers: if buyers of hospital
services cannot practicably purchase care from outside the locality, a
monopoly post-merger firm within the locality can profitably raise prices
and a larger post-merger firm in a tighter local oligopoly can collude
more easily, and thus more successfully, with its remaining competitors
to achieve the same undesirable end. In smaller geographic markets,
therefore, section 7's prohibition of mergers that may "tend substantially
to lessen competition" is more likely to be implicated.
In 1995, in two important hospital merger cases, antitrust courts
rejected the dominant view, adopting instead a much broader conception
of the geographic scope of hospital competition. In United States v.
Mercy Health Services,49 the Justice Department challenged the proposed
merger of the two largest general acute care hospitals in Dubuque,
Iowa."0 The relevant geographic market, according to the Department's
economic experts, consisted of Dubuque County and a half-circle with a
fifteen-mile radius extending eastward into Illinois and Wisconsin. This
area included, in addition to the defendant hospitals, a twenty-five-bed
hospital in Galena, Illinois." Eighty-eight percent of hospital patients
within that market, the parties agreed, used the three hospitals in
47. See, e.g., United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1285 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 920 (1990).
48. Id.; see also FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206 (1 th Cir. 1991); Hospital Corp. of
Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987).
49. 902 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Iowa 1995), appeal docketed, No. 95-4253 (8th C- 1995).
50. Id. at 971.
51. Id. at 976.
Vol. 71:899, 1996
Public Hospitals
question; eighty-six percent used one or both of the defendant hospitals.52
If the hospital market was indeed as local as the government claimed, the
merger was clearly unlawful.
The defendants, however, had a different view of the market. In their
opinion, it included not only the area described by the government, but
also encompassed several regional hospitals located as far away as Iowa
City, Iowa and Madison, Wisconsin, communities seventy to 100 miles
from Dubuque County.53 The defendants acknowledged that most people
in the Dubuque area sought hospitalization in the local hospitals, but
argued that if those hospitals tried, post-merger, to raise prices, the large
managed care companies whose members account for twenty-five
percent of hospitalizations in Dubuque would defeat price increases by
sending their insureds to the distant regional hospitals.54 This strategy
was plausible, defendants contended, because HMO members are highly
sensitive to price, and willing to drive the extra hour or two in order to
use the low-cost facilities.55
The court agreed. Finding that "the government's case rests too
heavily on past healthcare conditions and makes invalid assumptions as
to the reactions of third-party payers and patients to price changes,' 56 it
adopted a broad definition of the geographic market and consequently
approved the merger.57 According to the court, "the arrival of managed
care" over the past ten to fifteen years has not only changed the nature of
hospital competition from competition "on the basis of amenities and
perceptions of quality" to competition "on the basis of price,"58 but has
also greatly expanded the area in which hospitals compete for patients.59
In the court's view, managed care enrollees are "much more aware" of
the costs of hospitalization than patients covered by traditional indemnity
insurance, and thus more willing to travel long distances for hospital care
if they can realize significant savings.6' At the same time, the increased
use of outpatient services for procedures that traditionally required
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 978.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 978, 989.
58. Id. at 973 (noting, however, that competition for Medicare, Medicaid, and traditional
indemnity patients still occurs on basis of amenities and patients' perceptions about quality).
59. Id. at 974.
60. Id. at 973-74.
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overnight hospitalization, coupled with a trend toward shorter hospital
stays, have led hospitals ("needing to maintain their patient volume") to
establish outreach clinics, link up with physician-owned clinics, even
those at some remove from the hospitals themselves, ar.d extend their
marketing efforts into "catchment areas" that were once: the exclusive
preserves of other, distant hospitals.6'
According to the court, the underlying facts of hospital competition in
Iowa had changed dramatically since the advent of managed care.62 As a
consequence, the area of effective competition has expanded,
transforming what were formerly local markets into regional ones.63 The
Dubuque hospitals, the court found, compete in one of these "new"
markets.' Although managed care companies account for only twenty-
five percent of the hospitals' income, their business is crucial to the
hospitals' financial well-being.65 Should these hospitals raise prices post-
merger, the companies' willingness to send members as far away as
Madison or Iowa City, along with the members' inclination to make
those trips, mean that Dubuque consumers have nothing to fear from the
merger. The presence of regional hospitals-seventy to 100 miles
away-and their competitive prices, the court ruled, would preserve
competitive pricing for consumers in Dubuque.6
The government has appealed the ruling in Mercy, as well it might. In
its view, hospital markets are still local; HMOs have bee:a successful in
wresting price reductions from competing local hospitals; and if hospital
consolidation proceeds apace in local markets, IMOs will lose their
bargaining leverage and consumer prices will rise.67 The dispute on
appeal revolves around the weight and admissibility of' the evidence
regarding the willingness of HMO members to travel long distances to
save on hospital expenses, evidence that the government contends is
highly questionable.6"
The larger issue, however, concerns the future of hospital merger
analysis and its effect on merger enforcement. If the Mercy court's broad
61. Id.
62. Id. at 972-73.
63. Id. at 974.
64. Id. at 975.
65. Id. at 972-73.
66. Id. at987
67. Government's Opening Brief at 17-30, United States v. Mercy Health Servs. (8th Cir. Mar. 1,
1996) (No. 95-4253; Cross-Appeal No. 96-105 1).
68. Id.
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view of hospital competition is correct, federal enforcement policy
respecting hospital mergers, which has never been particularly
aggressive, is apt to come to a complete standstill. If acute care hospitals
within 100 miles of one another are truly competitors, then it would seem
that, in regions where managed care companies have sufficiently large
enrollments, hospital mergers will be effectively immune from antitrust
challenge. Antitrust law will thus have little effect on hospital mergers,
whose occurrence will then depend entirely upon business judgment. 9
A few days after deciding Mercy, the Eighth Circuit affirmed a lower
court ruling that rejected another government challenge to a proposed
hospital merger. In FTC v. Freeman Hospital," two of the three general
acute care hospitals in Joplin, Missouri sought to merge.7 The
government objected, claiming that the merger would likely result in
increased prices in the geographic market defined as Joplin and areas
within a twenty-seven mile radius of it.7" Not only did the government
provide the usual expert testimony in support of its definition, it also
introduced testimony from Joplin employers that if post-merger hospital
prices increased due to collusion "few patients currently traveling to
Joplin for care would travel instead to hospitals located outside the
FTC's proposed geographic market."'73 As in Mercy, if the government's
market definition was correct, the merger was conceded to be unlawful.
But, as in Mercy, the defendants claimed that the relevant market was
much larger, a thirteen-county area that included seventeen hospitals
located up to fifty-four miles from Joplin.74 In that market, the
government acknowledged, the merger would raise no antitrust concern.
The district court in Freeman had rejected the government's proposed
market definition, stating that it failed to show where consumers of
hospital services could practicably turn for alternatives. The appeals
court affirmed. The government's analysis, it said, "gives a static, rather
than a dynamic, picture of the acute care market," fails to provide
"insight into the future effects of the allegedly anti-competitive merger,"
69. An unwelcome view, and one apparently shared by Melvin H. Orlans, senior litigation
attorney in the FTC's Office of General Counsel, is that "[i]f enough courts keep saying that broader
markets are appropriate,... it will prevent us from challenging hospital merger cases." Jeannine
Mjoseth, Hospital Mergers: FTC Needs Success in Grand Rapids Case to Bolster Ability to
Challenge Mergers, 5 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 20 (May 16, 1996).
70. 69 F.3d 260 (8th Cir. 1995).
71. Id. at 262.
72. Id. at 265.
73. Id. at 269.
74. Id. at 265.
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and thus falls short of the applicable legal standard. Although the
testimony of the Joplin employers was admittedly relevant on this score,
"the views of market participants are not always sufficient: to establish a
relevant market, especially when their testimony fails to address
specifically the practicable choices available to consumers."
75
Freeman differs from Mercy in significant respects. In Mercy, the
court used the traditional test for defining the relevant market and found,
as a matter of fact, that recent developments in healthcare competition
had expanded substantially the area in which the defendant hospitals
actually competed. In Freeman, although the court purported to apply the
traditional test, it rejected the government's proposed market definition
as insufficiently "dynamic," while failing to provide any guidance as to
how this dynamic standard might be satisfied. These differences,
however, are less important than the shared view that hospital
competition is not necessarily local anymore and that hospital mergers
must be tested against a backdrop of vigorous regional competition. If
broadly applicable, this expansive definition of the relevant geographic
market will discourage future challenges to hospital mergers, and add
fuel to the merger movement now under way.
B. HMO Growth
Hospital executives report that the private merger movement is a
direct response to the emergence of large, managed care organizations.76
As HMOs have become larger and more powerful, the ir bargaining
leverage has forced hospitals to reduce costs in order to remain
competitive and profitable. Merger is a time-honored method of reducing
costs and hospitals have turned to it, they say, to cope with the growth of
the HMO sector.77
Mercy and Freeman demonstrate that courts have come to regard
hospital markets as sufficiently broad to permit mergers that would have
been impermissible in smaller markets. Their view of the effective scope
of hospital competition bodes well for the continuation of the hospital
merger boom. If, however, antitrust courts were to limit the continued
growth of HMOs then perhaps the need for hospital mergers would abate
and the unfortunate social consequences of consolidation could be
75. Id. at 270.
76. See Scott, supra note 32.
77. Lucette Lagnado, Top New York Medical Centers to Merge, Wall St. J., July 25, 1996, at B12;
David R. Olmos, Tenet to Buy Rival OrNdafor $3.2 Billion, L.A. Times, Oct. 18, 1996, at D1.
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avoided or delayed. In another case decided last year, though, Blue Cross
& Blue Shield United v. Marshfield Clinic,78 the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals effectively held that the antitrust laws pose few obstacles to
mergers between large HMOs.
In Marshfield, Blue Cross & Blue Shield (BCBS) sued Marshfield
Clinic and its HMO subsidiary.79 BCBS alleged, among other things, that
the clinic had violated section 2 of the Sherman Act8 by acquiring a
monopoly of the HMO "market" in the fourteen counties of north central
Wisconsin and unlawfully excluding the BCBS HMO from doing
business in that "market." The jury awarded BCBS a sizeable verdict
that, after trebling, remittitur, and the addition of attorney's fees,
amounted to just under twenty million dollars."1 On appeal, one of the
critical issues was whether HMOs constitute a distinct product market for
antitrust purposes.8" If so, the clinic would be a monopolist and the
verdict might stand. If not, and HMOs were instead simply one
component of the much broader market for physician services, then the
clinic was not a monopolist and could not have violated section 2's
prohibition against monopolization.
Writing for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner ruled that "HMOs are
not a market."83 Employers and medical insurers, he stated, regard them
"as competitive not only with each other but also with the various types
of fee-for-service provider[s]."'  He noted that preferred provider
organizations (PPOs) ("under which the insurer offers more generous
reimbursement if the insured patronizes physicians who have contracts
with the insurer to provide service at low cost to its insureds") are
78. 65 F.3d 1406 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1288 (1996).
79. Id. at 1408.
80. Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides that "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt
to monopolize... any part of the trade or commerce among the several States... shall be deemed
guilty of a felony .... " 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). Section 4 of the Clayton Act creates a private right of
action for "any person... injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the
antitrust laws" and directs the award to successful private plaintiffs of treble damages costs of suit,
including reasonable attorney's fees. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).
81. Marshfield, 65 F.3d at 1408.
82. In technical terms, the relevant product market in an antitrust inquiry is defined by the cross-
elasticity of demand between a given product and its substitutes. 2 Phillip E. Areeda & Donald F.
Turner, Antitrust Law 519a (1978). The cross-elasticity of demand for substitutes measures
consumers' propensity to switch from one product to another, similar product when relative prices
change. See William J. Baumol & Alan S. Blinder, Economics: Principles and Policy 387 (1985).
Products similar enough that a small relative price change causes consumers to substitute one for
another are in the same product market. Areeda & Turner, supra, 525a.
83. Marshfield, 65 F.3d at 1412.
84. Id. at 1410.
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"particularly close substitutes for HMOs." All that is needed for their
formation is "an array of physicians who among them provide a broad
range of medical services." 5 Because PPOs and other forms of medical-
services contracting constrain the price that HMOs can charge, there is
no separate "HMO market." Instead HMOs are components of the much
larger market in medical services. 6
Although Marshfield dealt with claims of monopolization and
territorial division, not with a merger challenge, its ruling that HMOs do
not constitute a separate product market is likely to offer further
encouragement to the growth of HMOs and managed care companies
generally. Indeed, Marshfield is simply the latest in a lengthening string
of opinions to decide that HMOs compete with other forms of healthcare
financing and medical service contracting.87 By including HMOs within
that broad product market, these opinions create important precedent for
analyzing proposed mergers. 8  Having ruled that IMOs do not constitute
a separate product market for purposes of section 2 of the Sherman Act,
courts are unlikely to define them as a separate market for merger
purposes.
If HMOs are regarded as competing against all other medical service
providers, the merger of two large managed care comparies would be
unlikely to arouse antitrust suspicion. The relevant product market would
simply be too large to be adversely affected by one merger. Should an
HMO merger be challenged, courts would probably conclude that if the
HMO's post-merger prices were to exceed competitive levels, consumers
in these broad product markets could readily switch to one of the many
competitive substitutes.
These recent cases strongly suggest that antitrust law is ini the process
of defining healthcare markets so as to effectively encourage the
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1411.
87. See, e.g., U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 596-97 (1st Cir. 1993)
(affirming magistrate's finding that, in relevant geographic market (New Himpshire), HMOs
compete as sellers in market that includes "all health financing" and as buyers in market for "doctor
services," both of which are too broad to permit easy monopolization); see also Ball Memorial Hosp.
v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., 784 F.2d 1325, 1331 (7th Cir. 1986) (affirming lower court holding that
traditional health insurance, PPOs, IMOs, and self-insuring employers all offer "methods of
financing health care" that compete against one another in "health care financing" market).
88. Because market definition is highly fact-intensive one court's determinaticn in this regard is
not strictly binding on another. Nevertheless, the courts' factual determinations respecting HMOs all
have been premised on a shared understanding of how those markets function. later opinions also
have borrowed the language and reasoning of the earlier ones.
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continued consolidation of HMOs and hospitals.8 9 By expanding the
boundaries of the geographic and product markets in which hospitals and
IMOs are deemed to compete, these rulings will provide important
precedent for shielding most mergers in those markets from antitrust
challenge. If those rulings accurately reflect the new realities of
healthcare competition, then almost all hospitals and HMOs may
continue to merge and grow, unconstrained by antitrust law. And if the
policy concerns animating these rulings are correct, consumers should
welcome continued concentration in these markets as the harbinger of
increased competition and lower prices.
As suggested above, while consumer welfare may improve,
improvements may come at the expense of social well-being. The
continued expansion of the private hospital sector could well toll the
death knell for public hospitals and the important social services that
they provide. Because of antitrust's exclusive focus on "consumer
welfare," narrowly conceived, and on lower prices for those capable of
buying healthcare, conventional antitrust analysis seems powerless to
arrest this movement and incapable of considering the social interests at
stake.
IV. ANTITRUST FAILURE AND HEALTHCARE MARKETS
During the past decade, antitrust scholars and economists have
conducted a heated debate over the nature of competition in hospital and
medical service markets. One school contends that those markets respond
to the same economic forces as other industries, and that active antitrust
enforcement can therefore produce important benefits for consumers.9" A
second claims that healthcare markets differ fundamentally from others.9'
It argues that market "imperfections," such as inadequate consumer
information, tax incentives to over-consume, and government-induced
over-capacity, make hospital competition "wasteful." On its view, these
89. Antitrust law also appears to offer very little discouragement to the continued growth of
physician groups offering certain specialties. See, e.g., Morgenstern v. Wilson, 29 F.3d 1291, 1296
(8th Cir. 1994) (reversing jury finding limiting relevant geographic market for Lincoln, Nebraska-
based cardiac surgeon to Lincoln and 26 surrounding counties; ruling that Omaha also should have
been included in market definition because it was place to which purchasers "can practicably turn"),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1100 (1995).
90. See, e.g., David L. Meyer & Charles F. Rule, Health Care Collaboration Does Not Require
Substantive Antitrust Reform, 29 Wake Forest L. Rev. 169 (1994).
91. See, e.g., Fredric J. Entin et al., Hospital Collaboration: The Need For An Appropriate
Antitrust Policy, 29 Wake Forest L. Rev. 107, 123 (1994) ("Hospital markets do not strictly follow
the competitive paradigm.").
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imperfections counsel in favor of less intrusive antitrust enforcement,
fewer merger challenges, and greater consideration of the industry's
peculiarities. A third school asserts that because nonprofit hospitals do
not exercise market power to the same extent as for-profit firms (do not
raise prices as much in markets where they have high market shares),
powerful nonprofits pose less of a threat to competition and that mergers
between them should therefore be treated more leniently by enforcement
authorities. 92
Although these contending schools disagree about t:he nature of
healthcare markets, they share a common but flawed understanding about
the goals of antitrust policy in those markets. All believe that the critical
question facing healthcare antitrust policy is the factual. one of how
hospital markets really work. In their view, this question is important
because its answer will shape the way in which antitrust policy seeks to
maximize consumer welfare. Each implicitly believes that the consumer
welfare model that informs antitrust analysis generally is appropriate for
hospital markets and that antitrust policy in healthcare markets should
focus, as it does in other markets, exclusively on the goal of maximizing
consumer welfare. In my opinion, this is a mistaken belief.
Hospital markets are meant to serve society as well as consumers.
Simply by virtue of their membership in society, the poor are entitled to
healthcare. This characteristic is what makes healthcare markets unique
and also makes the consumer welfare model of antitrust analysis ill-fitted
to those markets. As currently conceived, antitrust analysis is unable or
unwilling to balance the interests of consumers against those of the poor.
In most markets, there is arguably no need for this kind of balancing
because the interests of consumers are presumptively those of the
community. Indeed, in most markets, the relevant comm'anity consists
strictly and entirely of paying customers. In most cases, then, an
exclusive focus on consumer welfare might not necessarily be misplaced.
In hospital markets, though, the community is broader than antitrust
analysis can conceive. In these markets, the community consists of
everyone, not just those with money. Healthcare is a merit good, one that
we all deserve regardless of financial circumstance. In partial recognition
of our commitment to this goal, tax dollars have for decades funded the
construction and maintenance of public hospitals and have subsidized
many social programs thought critical to community health. But our
long-standing commitment to the poor should have taught us that
92. See William J. Lynk, Nonprofit Hospital Mergers and the Exercise of Market Power, 38 J.L.
& Econ. 437 (1995).
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healthcare markets are unavoidably imperfect, intentionally so, and for
good reason. The critical issue for policymakers should therefore be not
to quarrel about whether and to what extent imperfections distort
healthcare markets but to identify instead the imperfections of antitrust
policy as applied to those markets and to resolve the conflict between the
narrow doctrinal conception of consumer welfare and the public good
more broadly conceived.
The exclusive focus of antitrust courts precludes their consideration of
the social values that inform, or ought to inform, the debate about
competition in healthcare markets. But the problem with antitrust and
healthcare markets is not simply a problem of misguided judicial
philosophy. A broader conception of social values, if applied partially
and episodically through antitrust enforcement and judicial decision-
making, would probably do more to distort the marketplace than to
reform it. At bottom, antitrust adjudication is simply a poor vehicle for
healthcare policy-making.
Comprehensive regulation is the only solution. Despite the current
widespread skepticism about the efficacy of regulatory regimes, active
administrative oversight offers the best source of protection against
private competition's eventual eradication of public health programs. A
wide variety of regulatory options is possible, individually or in
combination. Tax monies can be redistributed from private to public
hospitals. Voucher systems can provide healthcare dollars to all and the
freedom to spend them as each sees fit. Government can require private
hospitals to share the expenses of important social programs. Private
organizations can bid to develop, administer, and staff those programs.
But some form of aggressive regulation is essential in order to foster the
public good.
By succeeding on its own terms, antitrust has failed. More
significantly perhaps, it is destined to fail. In healthcare markets,
consumer welfare is not synonymous with social well-being. Indeed, an
increasingly competitive environment threatens to extinguish many of
our most important public facilities and programs. But antitrust policy is
incapable of either recognizing or responding to this dilemma. We are
more, one would hope, than a nation of consumers. In the provision of
healthcare at least, we profess to care for the weakest among us. But
because antitrust cannot countenance this aspiration or promote the
values necessary for its preservation, it is inadequate to protect public
health.

